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ABSTRACT 
In some sense there is a very simple answer to the title question: 
Southeast Europe is heading towards the EU, though a period of 
weak regional cooperation, asymmetric relations with the EU and a 
slow and discontinuous accession process. The speed and 
discontinuity of this process, together with the changing character 
and purpose of the process of regional cooperation, raise two crucial 
questions for the region. First, is there a need for regional 
cooperation and integration in SEE? Second, what type of 
cooperation is needed? The paper seeks to address these questions by 
discussing the challenges and opportunities resulting from recent 
developments in the region (‘EU distancing’, ‘regional ownership’, 
etc) and their implications for the perspective that the region can 
follow. In doing so, it attempts an analysis of the goals of regionalism 
in Southeast Europe and offers some policy proposals for its future. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite some obvious similarities, the transition process in the Balkans has 
been very different from that of the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs). This is both because of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the 
inter-ethnic conflicts and open wars that followed and because of the very 
‘Balkanised’ transition that was followed: on the one hand a delayed transition; 
on the other, a dual (or even triple) transition, which includes not only the 
process of transformation from the communist structures to the capitalist 
economy but also a process of development, with the countries in question 
moving from a state of semi-agricultural and in any case not industrialised-
proper economies to structures of service-oriented and knowledge-based 
economies. A third transition, of course, which justifies the term ‘triple 
transition’, includes the very transition from war (and the associated war 
economies) to peace.1 It is in the context of such ‘transitions’ that the European 
perspective emerged in –and for– the region.  
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 This is a rather different use of the term than the one initially described by Offe (1997) and it perhaps 
suggests that the region in fact experienced quadruple or even quintuple transitions (see Kuzio, 2001).  
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On the other hand, also the European approach to the region has been markedly 
different from that concerning the CEECs. First, evidently, there has been no en 
bloc treatment of, and accession for, the countries of Southeast Europe. Second, 
the EU approach to the region has changed dramatically over the years, with 
the approach initially adopted (in the beginning of the 1990s) being very 
different from the approach adopted more recently. Overall, there is a clearly 
identifiable gradual deepening of the EU’s involvement in the region reaching, 
very recently (after the 2007 enlargement), a point of saturation, with a new 
and indeed novel idea coming forward concerning ‘regional ownership’ and the 
establishment of the Regional Cooperation Council, which will absorb – and, 
for all practical purposes, replace – the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
(Busek, 2003).  
Given these idiosyncraticities and the developments with regards to the EU’s 
involvement in the region, a question that clearly and rather emphatically 
emerges is what happens to Balkan economic cooperation without accession: 
without the immediate prospect of accession and the carrots and sticks 
associated to it? To address this issue it is useful to draw a number of analytical 
distinctions that can help disentangle the key concepts that are of relevance and 
that are often crudely summarised in the antithesis between the European and 
regional perspectives (or, even more crudely, between Europeanisation and 
Balkanisation) (Bianchini and Uvalic, 1997; Demetropoulou, 2002). These 
distinctions can be made along three conceptual dimensions. The first concerns 
the alternative –competitive or complementary– perspectives for the region: the 
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European perspective, meaning the region ‘moving to Europe’ or becoming 
increasingly an integral part of Europe; and the regional perspective, meaning 
the region becoming an organic region in itself. The second concerns two 
alternative processes, which again can be seen as either competing or 
complementary: the process of integration and the process of cooperation. 
While the latter (cooperation) is mainly about policy communication and 
exchange in an attempt to harmonise policy, the process of integration 
undoubtedly concerns something deeper and more organic. Finally, there is a 
distinction to be made between the two geographical and geo-political levels at 
which these processes and perspectives can be –and are being– materialised: 
the European and the regional.  
Drawing these distinctions is extremely helpful and, I would argue, necessary 
in order to establish the context within which the various policy options can be 
evaluated and analysed. This is for at least two reasons: first, because often the 
terms cooperation and integration are used interchangeably and without any 
clear account of their analytical distance; second, because the meaning of the 
term perspective is often quite blurred, reflecting in some sense a conflation 
between the location/scale and the orientation/objectives of the examined 
processes (be they processes of integration or of cooperation). In other words, 
there is a deficiency in separating between (a) where these processes take place 
and (b) under which perspective they are being evaluated.  
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Some examples should be useful here. If one employs as the analytical-
evaluation basis the European perspective, then quite evidently regional 
cooperation is little more than simply a means for European accession: the 
Balkan states have to cooperate with one another because this is part of the 
(extended) conditionality of the European Union; cooperating ‘as old Member 
States do’ is a precondition for eventually becoming members of the EU family 
(EC, 2005a). Conversely, if one is to employ a regional perspective, then the 
meaning and implications of regional cooperation change dramatically. From 
such a perspective regional cooperation is really a strategy and an opportunity 
for the countries in the region to restructure their economies: regional 
cooperation allows the Balkan countries to exchange policy ideas and best 
practices, so as to achieve an effective and sustainable restructuring of their 
respective economies and thus enter into a sustainable development path that 
will eventually lead to economic convergence with the western European 
partners. Similarly, one can examine the implications and meanings of the 
different types of processes or the different geographical scales (for example, 
examining the meaning of European integration under the two distinct 
perspectives) and explore the policy priorities and recommendations emerging 
from the different combinations. The table below depicts in a summary form 
the resulting priorities and recommendations.  
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Table: Regionalism versus the European Perspective 
Perspective 
Level and 
Process European Regional 
Regional   
Cooperation Means for EU accession 
Means for restructuring / 
development 
Integration Substitute to EU accession Complement to global integration 
European   
Cooperation Substitute to EU accession 
Means for restructuring / 
development 
Integration 
Means for restructuring / 
development 
Substitute to regional integration 
It is evident from the above table (but still very important to highlight) that if 
one takes the European perspective as the starting point it is almost inevitable 
that the optimal policy proposal will point towards the direction of regional 
cooperation and European integration. This is what we actually observe: both 
the EU and the countries concerned adopt a European perspective as their 
starting point and thus they invariantly perceive regional cooperation almost 
singularly as a means for acceding to the EU (European integration) – and they 
moreover try to ensure that the former will not become a substitute to EU 
accession. Conversely, if one adopts a regional perspective as the point of 
departure, which implies that there is an inward focus towards the region itself 
and the EU is presented as a key element of a wider context, then rather 
obviously the policy proposal that emerges is one concerning strengthening 
regional integration as a means of complementing and managing the process of 
internationalisation of the Balkan economic space (under globalisation). The 
logic here is that regional integration is a sustainable strategy for developing 
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the region as a single economic entity (one market) and European cooperation 
becomes then a useful means for downloading an operational policy framework 
(and much-needed institutional, political and financial assistance) that can 
support restructuring and development for the region.  
Some important questions for the region arise immediately from this analytical 
decomposition. First, how do the different choices impact on the developmental 
model of the region and the development path / trajectory that the region can 
follow? Second, and equally importantly, how do the recent policy 
developments, especially the creation of the Regional Cooperation Council in 
2008, change the balance between the two perspectives (the European and the 
regional)? Linked to these central questions is the more subtle but also more 
pressing issue for the Balkans concerning what is to be done without an 
immediate prospect of accession. The remainder of this paper is concerned 
exactly with these questions. We start with an examination of the current 
situation in the region with regards to economic integration and policy 
harmonisation – in other words, the state of play of southeast European 
regionalism. 
 
2. Southeast European regionalism 
There are a number of overlapping literatures that address directly or indirectly 
the issue of (SEE) regionalism, encompassing economic analyses of trade and 
foreign direct investment (Kaminski and de la Rocha, 2003; Bjelic, 2005; 
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Kandogan, 2005), political economic analyses of regional cooperation and 
policy preference convergence (Bartlett and Samardzija, 2000; Welfens, 2001; 
Bechev, 2004), and policy analyses of specific policies and processes (Kekic, 
2001; Lopandic, 2002; Liebscher, 2005). The following review of the situation 
in SEE links to all of these sub-literatures and further draws a distinction across 
the four main markets: the product market, the labour market, the capital 
market and the financial market; and between these and the domain of policy.2  
As will be shown, despite some significant steps towards both policy 
harmonisation and economic cooperation, still much remains to be done and 
not everything is at the level or the direction that would deem these processes 
sufficiently satisfactory.  
The product market (trade in goods and services) has seen some very fast and 
very deep liberalisation, even leading to cases of extreme trade openness (in the 
sense that trade takes up an unusually high share of national GDP in most SEE 
countries). On the other hand, intra-regional trade links are uncharacteristically 
low and we see very little trade in both absolute and relative terms between the 
countries in the region. The EU is by far the most significant trade partner for 
all SEE countries. However, even within the EU, SEE trade exhibits a very 
skewed geographical distribution: almost half of all SEE trade (and over two-
thirds of trade with the EU) is with only four EU member states (Italy, Greece, 
                                                 
2
 The discussion of the developments in the product market is based, inter alia, on Messerlin and Maur 
(2000), Astrov (2001), Christie (2001), Gligorov (2001), EC (2005b), Gaucaite-Wittich (2005), 
Kernohan (2006), Uvalic (2006) and DeRosa and Kernohan (2007). Similarly, the discussion regarding 
the empirical evidence and observed patterns in the capital market is based on Labrianidis (1996), 
Gligorov (2001), World Bank (2003), Desmet and Rojas (2004) and Demekas et al (2005). 
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Austria and Germany). One important implication of that is of course the very 
high trade deficits registered by most countries in the region.3 This is also due 
to the specific nature of SEE exports. The type of products that are coming out 
of the region predominantly are low value-added consumer-goods. This implies 
that the per-employee value of exports is lower compared to that of imports but 
also, and crucially, that this ratio has the tendency to decline over time 
(worsening terms of trade).  
The capital market has also experienced significant liberalisation and is 
characterised by very high openness. In this field we also see some denser and 
deeper steps towards policy harmonisation. However, the situation with regards 
to intra-regional linkages in the case of FDI is dismal. With the exception of 
Greek FDI in the region and some more recent brownfield investments 
(mergers and acquisitions; take-overs) across the former Yugoslavia (mainly 
from Serbia and Croatia to the corresponding ‘ethnic parts’ of Bosnia-
Herzegovina), there is effectively no intra-regional FDI in the region. A partial 
explanation for this is the very high competition from abroad for a given set of 
brownfield investments (mainly through privatisation) and the very few market 
opportunities and very high entry costs for some greenfield investments (e.g., 
mobile technologies). However, even the type of FDI coming from outside the 
region, is in many respects not the most productive or the most appropriate for 
inducing high rates of growth (by creating positive externalities through 
                                                 
3
 Although in most cases these trade deficits are being counter-balanced by the positive current account 
balances that are due to FDI inflows, the nature of the trade deficits appears to be structural and thus it 
is more difficult to address – especially in the context of very high capital mobility and a fast changing 
structure of economic incentives for investing abroad.   
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knowledge transfers, importation of new production methods and processes, 
development of new products, etc) and speeding up economic restructuring. 
Extra-regional FDI is concentrating mainly on distribution and services 
targeting specifically the domestic market – and these are sectors that are not 
normally producing very large spillovers, at least in the context of developing / 
semi-industrialised economies.  
Regarding the labour market, there is no integration process and hardly any 
relevant dynamic (Huber, 2006). There is a huge, well-reported and well-
studied emigration movement (outflow of population), especially from Albania 
but also from all other SEE countries. This, however, does not constitute a pure 
labour market flow, in the sense that it has not really been driven by traditional 
labour market equilibration criteria (e.g., relative value of the expected wage in 
the recipient economy) and is not actually operating as a mechanism that can 
bring about labour market equilibrium. The migration experience in SEE can 
be best described as an exodus of a large part of the population to avoid the 
hardship associated with the fall of communism and the process of transition to 
capitalism (and, in the case of former Yugoslavia, the ones associated to war 
and ethnic violence) and only heuristically it can be seen as labour mobility in a 
textbook sense (equilibrating labour mobility). Rather, it is perhaps causing 
deeper obstacles to labour mobility within and across the countries of the 
region and thus also to regional labour market integration (Horvat, 2004). 
Further, it needs to be noted that cross-country commuting is extremely limited 
(although there is hardly any reliable data source to measure actual commuting 
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flows across countries in the region), even in the case of the republics of former 
Yugoslavia (where the historical, linguistic, infrastructural and other factors 
that are normally associated with commuting interactions are in fact present). 
Regarding the institutional aspects of the labour market, notably there is very 
little in terms of coordination of employment policies – let alone wage policies 
or training and education policies (including recognition of professional and 
vocational qualifications etc) (Arandarenko, 2004; Sosic, 2004). The countries 
are characterised by very different pension and benefits systems and do not 
have a unified migration and repatriation policy.  
In contrast to the labour market, the financial market is clearly the most 
liberalised and represents the most developed area of economic cooperation in 
the region (Liebscher, 2005). This of course has been mainly a market-driven 
process in the sense that financial investments form the private sector is what 
actually drives the integration process (Bini-Smaghi, 2006). An interesting 
example here is some recent moves towards financial market integration with 
some M&As of stock exchange markets in former Yugoslavia, some moves 
toward cross-border stock-market coordination and, very recently, the signing 
of a new Memorandum of Understanding for regional cooperation by all 
Central Banks in the region.  
Although the financial sector is indeed the main area where market 
developments link directly to, or stimulate, processes of policy coordination, a 
quite dense network of policy coordination schemes and initiatives in the 
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region exists in many other sectors (see, among others, Lopandic, 2002 and 
Bechev, 2006), irrespective of whether market-driven or not. Regional 
cooperation in the realm of policy encompasses a wide range of issues, 
including trade (with the recent establishment of the SEEFTA as an extension 
of CEFTA), energy (e.g., the Community Energy Treaty), transport, aviation 
and investment (through the Investment Compact, which harmonises the policy 
environment for investment in the region), but also aspects besides the 
economy, for example significant agreements for border security, asylum 
seekers, immigration, trafficking, environmental issues and so forth.4  
Nevertheless, as has been extensively discussed in the literature (Bianchini and 
Uvalic, 1997; Gligorov et al, 1999; Bartlett and Samardzija, 2000; Uvalic, 
2001; Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002; Altman, 2003; Dimitrova, 
2003; Bechev, 2004 and 2006), SEE regional cooperation is not something that 
has developed indigenously and, importantly, with domestic-regional concerns 
in mind. Rather, it is a case of imported regionalism.5 SEE regional cooperation 
is not only dictated by the EU’s extended conditionality (EC, 2006 – see also 
Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003) but, more importantly, it has become a notion 
that is inexorably linked to the European perspective, as can be seen throughout 
the various policy documents concerning the region and most emphatically 
crystallised in the Thessaloniki Declaration.  
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that this network has been established in a pretty much developmental process, as 
the EU became more and more involved in the region (starting with the ‘Regional Approach’ in 1996, 
the establishment of the SPSEE in 1999, the institutionalisation of SEECP progressively since the late 
1990s, and the consolidation of regionalism that comes with the creation of the Regional Cooperation 
Council in early 2008). 
5
 On the EU’s function as a ‘promoter of regionalism’ see Schimmelfennig (2007).  
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In some cases the process of cooperation is only because of a European 
process. For example, the Energy Community Treaty, which has been much 
heralded as a great development in (and for) the region, was devised neither in 
nor for the region (rather, it was simply ‘presented’ to the region as a form of 
EU-promoted regionalism). Similar are the dynamics in the fields of land 
transport and aviation. In some other cases, the cooperation process is entirely 
dictated by external (or externally inspired) processes. This is the case with 
trade integration in the region: the official establishment of SEEFTA (still, only 
as an annexation to CEFTA) was only possible after the full net of bilateral 
agreements had been completed, all under the strong encouragement, if not 
direct guidance, of the EU. In some other areas, especially where it concerns 
policy harmonisation, cooperation is clearly ad hoc, being directly the outcome 
of the process of adopting the EU acquis. Finally, some cooperation processes 
and agreements still remain fragmented (bilateral), as is for example the case of 
the two recently established gas and oil pipelines of Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
and Turkey-Greece-Italy.  
All in all, there have been very few attempts to develop truly intra-regional 
policy harmonisation and cooperation and, where some such attempts are 
identifiable, they are often mainly market-driven, in the sense that market 
developments dictate, encourage or necessitate, similar developments in the 
realm of policy. Despite the rhetoric of regional cooperation, a ‘regionalist 
deficiency’ is clearly identifiable in the region. 
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3. SEE regionalism evaluated 
This ‘regionalist deficiency’ is not unrelated to the way the EU has been 
approaching the question of SEE regionalism. Despite the rhetoric (see for 
example EC, 2005a) the EU has a very functional view concerning what SEE 
regionalism is, or can be: it is a series of commitments that are taken by the 
SEE countries in exchange for deeper association with the EU and which can 
ensure that another ‘Balkan war’ does not erupt in the region in the future. 
Interestingly, also functional (and rhetorical) is the region’s own view of SEE 
regionalism (see for example the 2006 speech of the Bulgarian Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs at the Irish Institute for European Affairs provocatively titled 
“SEE the road to Europe”): ‘Europe’ remains the destination and regional 
cooperation is simply the ‘road to Europe’. It is as if by ‘going to Europe’ the 
SEE countries can leave the Balkans behind! Trapped in this rhetoric both sides 
reduce regionalism to a functional(ist) tool for strengthening SEE 
‘Europeanisation’ and fail to see its potentially instrumental  role for regional 
development and modernisation.6 
 
                                                 
6
 In this context, it is really worrisome how little theory has managed to inform policy-making in the 
region (for example, the tremendous advances in new trade theory and New Economic Geography have 
hardly been picked up in the academic and policy literatures that concern themselves with the region). 
We return to this point later in this section. 
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3.1. Regional cooperation versus regional integration 
How can we then evaluate the state of SEE regionalism, in other words, the 
progress of regional cooperation and integration? To do so, we go back to the 
analytical distinctions introduced earlier and examine from this perspective the 
developments in the four main economic areas reviewed above.  
In the area of trade, the European perspective is clearly what drives regional 
cooperation. The countries in the region have real difficulties finding natural 
trade partners intra-regionally and thus the main thrust for the development of 
the existing thick network of intra-regional trade agreements (now in the form 
of SEEFTA) has been provided by the need for deeper economic integration 
with the EU. However, the European perspective is also limiting regional 
integration, because by providing a push towards deepening the links with the 
EU it generates some trade diversion (or cancels some trade creation and 
diversion that could be happening in favour of intra-regional trade) that actually 
increases further the economic fragmentation (unconnectedness) of the region. 
Moreover, trade with the EU is also pushing the SEE economies towards 
specialisation in increasingly similar activities (and product-qualities), on that 
basis of what in the literature is known as hob-and-spoke linkages, thus making 
intra-regional trade increasingly difficult and unprofitable.7  
In the capital market, the European perspective, again, has intensified 
significantly capital market competition, making it particularly difficult for 
                                                 
7
 In this sense, there is almost a perfect analogy between this process of trade dependency and that 
experienced by some SEE countries, most notably Bulgaria, during the Cold War era in their trade 
relations with the then Soviet Union under CMEA.   
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domestic companies to compete and find a place in the regional capital market 
– which perhaps is a further limiting factor for regional (capital market) 
integration. However, the inflow of foreign investments and the competition 
for attracting such investments has also created the conditions for policy 
cooperation in this area, in the form of tax incentives and the like (or, at least, 
for attempts to this direction). In terms of the labour market, the European 
perspective can be linked to the significant outflow of skills, which is not 
conducive to the process of integration within the region. In this case no real 
regional process is triggered, as the EU is also lacking a specific framework for 
labour market cooperation internally (despite the Luxemburg process – see 
Nedergaard, 2006). It is only in the financial market where we see the 
European perspective being more conducive for both processes of regional 
cooperation and integration, as discussed above.  
Of course, the fact that the European perspective may be less conducive to 
regional integration is not by itself a problem. In order to be viewed as such, 
one needs to establish that deeper (and more organic) SEE integration is 
actually needed, in other words that it has identifiable beneficial effects, at least 
in the long run. To make this case, we review consecutively the political and 
economic rationales for regional integration in Southeast Europe. 
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3.2. SEE integration: does it make sense politically? 
The starting point for any argument making a case for political cooperation and 
policy harmonisation in the region has to start from history. Despite their 
fragmentation and ethnic hostility, the countries in the region share many 
historical, political and cultural commonalities. The region shares a common 
historical past and future trajectory; in other words, all countries in the region 
come from a very similar place (the inherited influences of the Ottoman 
Empire) and they all move, admittedly with different speeds and different 
degrees of success but notably through a very similar road (Europeanisation), 
to a very similar place (the enlarged EU). From this perspective it seems 
obvious that cooperation is the best strategy, even if in the way to reaching this 
same place, information asymmetries and short-term considerations may create 
strong incentives to ‘cheat’, i.e., to view this process as competitive and 
exclusive rather than as necessitating exploitation of synergies and information 
sharing.  
But besides this rather empirical observation about historical and future 
commonalities, political theory also offers strong arguments in support of 
collaboration in the Balkan context. Political cooperation and policy 
harmonisation are means to securing political stability and peace, which are 
essential factors for both indigenous and externally-led economic development 
(Rosamond, 2000). But they also help activate a number of processes that 
themselves facilitate speedier economic and political development internally, 
for example processes of policy learning (through information sharing and 
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policy exchange – see Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Eising, 2002; or Evans, 
2004), policy spillovers (through the functional interdependence of policies and 
policy transfers – see Radaelli, 2000 and Niemann, 2006) and policy preference 
convergence (through the identification and exploitation of synergies – see 
Bennett, 1991; Collignon, 2003; and Franchino, 2004). This of course helps 
create a harmonised political and economic environment, which cannot be but a 
good thing for the region, but importantly it also helps avoid inter-state 
competition, a concern which at the EU level has been expressed in the debate 
about the ‘race to the bottom’ (Persson and Tabellini, 1995), where competition 
among partners leads to a universal lowering of standards where everybody, 
albeit through optimal actions at the individual level, is becoming worst-off in 
comparison to a ‘cooperation’ scenario. The case of tax-incentives competition, 
in order to attract international FDI, is a good example here. Thus, the case for 
political and policy cooperation is well supported by historical, political as well 
as economic arguments.  
Moreover, it should be noted that there is also a clear efficiency argument to be 
made. Federalism, at the level of theory, as well as EU practice, has shown that 
some policies are more efficiently delivered at the supra-national level (Boerzel 
and Hosli, 2002). For example, competition policy only really makes sense at 
the supra-national level: when it disintegrates into independent national policies 
it becomes, rather counter-intuitively, protectionism! Similar are the arguments 
for redistribution and cohesion policies (i.e., where compliance cannot be 
guaranteed through state action or intergovernmentalism) but also for 
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investment and innovation policies (i.e., where there are clear economies of 
scale in the production of public goods or in the delivery of policies). 
 
3.3. SEE integration: does it make economic sense? 
The case for economic cooperation and, indeed, deeper economic integration is 
not any less well-supported. The most well documented argument in the 
literature is the ‘large-market effect’, i.e., the appreciation of the fact that larger 
markets are more attractive for large international businesses and other 
investors (FDI). The idea here is that ‘creating a region’ has important 
psychological as well as market effects, both acting in the same direction to 
enhance the attractiveness and visibility of the (countries within the) region. 
Trade theory offers many other insights that can be used to support the 
argument for regional integration – although admittedly in this field a number 
of arguments against regionalism in less developed regions (i.e., arguments in 
favour of North-South integration) can also be found. Without getting too deep 
into the theory, it is commonly observed that the type of integration (North-
South versus South-South; symmetric versus hub-and-spoke) plays an 
important role for the impact that integration has on overall welfare 
(development) and on the distribution of the gains from integration (Baldwin et 
al, 2005).  
North-South integration, in our case, Balkan-state integration with the EU, can 
create a number of asymmetries –and has in fact created such asymmetries– 
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most evidently observed in the hub-and-spoke trade relationship between the 
EU and the countries in the region (Gligorov, 2004). In this model of 
integration, most of the benefits from integration accrue to the developed 
partner (the EU) and the least developed partners are pushed towards 
production specialisations that are adverse in the long-run for the countries 
concerned (Georgakopoulos et al, 1994). The example here is for ‘South’ type 
countries, as was the case with Greece in the 1980s (and Greece took over 10 
years to recover from her own ‘accession shock’), to regress (‘specialise’) 
towards production in traditional industries (agriculture, natural resource 
extraction and basic manufacturing) with low value-added activities, low 
technological content and thus also worsening terms of trade over time.8  
It thus appears that the benefits from trade integration are greater the more 
similar are the trade partners, the faster and less costly they can absorb any 
technology transfers that are associated with trade and FDI, and the more they 
can exploit in similar degrees the benefits of market enlargement 
(Georgakopoulos et al, 1994; Chui et al, 2002). This makes the case for South-
South integration in SEE increasingly appealing – although counter-arguments 
would point to the fact that lack of technology and know-how as well as very 
strong similarities in the domestic production structures would suggest that 
there are very few things to be gained from this type of integration (Venables, 
2003). We return to this point in section 4.2, after looking first at the changes in 
the conditions of the region that accrue from EU’s new regional approach. 
                                                 
8
 On the experience of Greece and its relevance for the Balkan transition countries see Baliotas (1997), 
Petrakos and Pitelis (2001) and Tsounis (2002). 
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4. EU distancing: a challenge and an opportunity 
4.1. Challenges and opportunities 
As has been suggested already, the recent developments with regards to the 
EU, namely the absence of a specific date or timeframe for the next wave of 
enlargement and the shift towards promoting ‘regional ownership’ (with the 
consolidation of the SPSEE into the newly created RCC), what can be rather 
reasonably be seen as ‘EU distancing’, present both a challenge and an 
opportunity for Southeast Europe. A challenge concerning the question as to 
how to cooperate without the carrots and sticks associated to EU conditionality 
and the EU ‘pull factor’. But also an opportunity to define what is it that the 
region represents and what is the object of regional cooperation in the Balkans.  
Concerning the challenges, first it is clear that with the indefinite postponement 
of further enlargements the EU loses some of its ‘carrots’ (Bechev, 2006).9 
Moreover, own internal problems of the EU (related to the revision of 
established processes, such as its cohesion policy, SGP and the Lisbon strategy, 
but also to the opposition to moving forward with its institutional deepening, as 
is the case with the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty), mean that 
it also loses some of its ‘stick’. Of course this needs not be a problem by itself. 
                                                 
9
 There is a potentially much more important challenge related to this, namely the issue of whether EU 
distancing may cause disillusionment to the ones ‘left-out’ and thus also a further distancing from their 
side. This is obviously a very serious concern with regards to the Kosovo issue and the EU-Serbia 
relations. Although this and other security issues may be particularly important, we do not consider 
them in any detail here, partly because the focus of the paper is on more economic issues but also 
because we consider the chances of a revival of the 1990s conflicts to be –thankfully– extremely thin.   
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The very transformation of the SPSEE and the establishment of the RCC in 
2008 can reasonably be seen as a conscious effort, at least from the side of the 
EU, to institutionalise regional cooperation without the old framework of 
carrots and sticks, i.e., of positive and negative incentives or conditionality.10 
Nevertheless, this logic of a wider policy transformation that departs from such 
notions of conditionality and incentives does not seem to characterise the 
policy approach of either side (the EU and the SEE countries) (Anastasakis and 
Bechev, 2003). In this sense, the RCC is merely a waiting room for the non-EU 
SEECs ‘until the doors are open again’, i.e., until the next EU enlargement is 
possible.  
However, as has been mentioned already, there are also very good reasons to 
see such developments as a concrete set of opportunities for the SEE. With the 
promotion of ‘regional ownership’, SEE countries are invited to set their own 
agenda for cooperation, an agenda that can relate not only to the content but 
also to the speed and the extent of this cooperation (Busek, 2003; Cvijic, 2007). 
Thus, it appears that this is probably the first time, at least since the late 1980s / 
early 1990s, that the region has the opportunity and the freedom to ‘own’ its 
regional cooperation process (obviously, in the first period the choice it 
followed was at best catastrophic). But together with this opportunity and 
freedom comes an equally concrete responsibility for the region to take an 
introspective look in itself, produce an internal valuation of its needs, wants 
and potentials, develop a positive image for itself, and promote it externally. At 
                                                 
10
 On the role and types of EU accession conditionality see Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004), 
Hughes et al (2004) and Schimmelfennig et al (2006).  
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least some realisations of this process would call explicitly for the 
establishment of a coherent Balkan Development Plan (see Petrakos, 2002 and 
Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2008) – and this is really what ‘regional ownership’ 
calls the region to work towards.  
This rather optimistic account should not lead to an underestimation of the need 
to engage with a careful examination of the pros and cons of the different 
policy options for economic and political integration that are open to the region 
– as well as of the different developmental models that are available for the 
region, within the wider context of globalisation and international regionalism. 
Put differently, regional ownership transfers, at least partly, the locus of 
decision-making with regards to whether the region is going to specialise in 
producing textiles for the EU or cultural and other forms of tourism for the 
American market, to the centre of the region – rather than to some notional or 
real European decision-making centre (not necessarily related to Brussels as 
such: business headquarters, ‘EU demand’, or any other gravitational force 
could do).  
Importantly, this transfer allows the region to consider questions that until now 
it has rarely asked, for example how the dynamic of the emerging markets of 
India and China, but also of countries further afield (Brazil and South Africa), 
changes our perceptions about what are the areas and products where the region 
should focus to build its comparative and competitive advantages of the next 
decades – and in particular about how politically appropriate and economically 
efficient it is in the long-run for the region to specialise in products towards 
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which the region is pushed as a result of its intensive and extensive trade with 
the EU. In the analytical schema of Table 1, this was depicted in the 
‘complement to global integration’ box under regional integration from a 
regional perspective – a dimension that the insistence on the European 
perspective fails to capture.  
Although such an evaluation, of the advantages and disadvantages of different 
policy options and developmental regimes, is not something that can be 
reasonably undertaken within the limits of the present paper, it is however 
useful as a minimum here to review the main implications of the different 
policy approaches towards the EU or, in other words, of the chosen balance 
between European integration and regional cooperation for the region. Put 
differently, it is still useful to examine, albeit rather schematically, the expected 
pros and cons of European cooperation and integration vis-à-vis those of 
regional cooperation and integration. 
4.2. Evaluating the two perspectives: the cost of Europeanism 
One of the most obvious advantages of European integration is that it triggers 
political and economic reform – as has been shown very clearly in the 
transition literature but also experienced on the ground by almost all transition 
countries, where the EU has played a pivotal role in incentivising and 
promoting democratisation, liberalisation of markets, etc.11 The EU has also 
                                                 
11
 There are of course examples and instances where political (democratisation) and economic 
(liberalisation) transition proceeded fast and effectively also in the absence of a catalytic EU role; 
while, inversely, there are also many instances where such transitions have been much less speedy and 
effective, despite the EU. Moreover, there are also questions of simultaneity and endogeneity here, as 
the most successful ‘transformers’ where allowed to develop stronger links with the EU (endogeneity) 
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played an important role through supporting economic restructuring and 
general development through aid (not only through PHARE,  but also through 
the various other instruments, such as CARDS, IPA, SAAs, and the co-
financing from other institutions such as the World Bank, the EBRD, the 
European Investment Bank, etc). Finally, the process and prospect of European 
integration has undoubtedly contributed to the economic stabilisation of the 
region through the reduction of risks, the lowering of borrowing costs and of 
interest rates, and thus the attraction of increasing numbers of foreign 
investments in the region.  
In a sense, the main disadvantage of this process of European integration is the 
diversion from the objective of regional integration, despite the rhetoric and 
some efforts to this direction. As has been argued extensively in the literature 
(Uvalic, 2001; Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002; Dimitrova, 2003; 
Gligorov, 2004; Bechev, 2006), the EU has always maintained a predominantly 
bilateral approach to the region, either through its trade agreements or through 
its association agreements, thus increasing the fragmentation of the region and, 
importantly but less visibly in the literature, of the Balkan economic space 
(Petrakos and Economou, 2004; Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2007). Another 
disadvantage of the European perspective, which although captured well in 
works examining issues of implementation (e.g., studies on the Europeanisation 
of policy in the transition countries – see Grabbe, 2001; Hille and Knill, 2006; 
                                                                                                                                            
and as the geography of transition and accession suggests a much more exogenous pattern of success 
with transition (simultaneity). While such observations undoubtedly call for a more careful 
examination of the role of the EU and its ability to mobilise economic restructuring and political 
reforms, such a discussion is well beyond the objectives of this paper.  
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Johannsen, 2006) has not been integrated sufficiently in the literature on SEE 
regional cooperation, is that related to the actual and opportunity costs of 
adjusting to an alien and very complex institutional and policy framework, 
which is not necessarily or not always suitable for the region.  
There are many examples to support this statement, but the case of regional 
policy offers a particularly useful case. In this area, transition countries (which 
traditionally had very little experience with regional policy, needed strong 
central governments in order to implement unpopular but necessary reforms, 
and since the early 1990s had developed a culture of anti-planning and local 
competition) were required to implement a model of fiscal decentralisation 
(due to the nature of EU funding) and administrative divisions of space (due to 
EUROSTAT requirements) that created significant problems of organisation, 
control and ultimately of efficacy of the very policies that such structures were 
supposed to facilitate (Thielemann, 2002; Hughes et al, 2004; Monastiriotis, 
2006).  
There are however numerous other concerns regarding the true impact of the 
European orientation of the region, some of which emanate from trade theory 
considerations. Here one can identify, as also noted earlier, the implications of 
developing increasingly adverse specialisations in the production and export 
bases, the trends of worsening terms of trade for the products and qualities 
produced in the region, the asymmetric role of trade costs for countries / 
products with different price elasticities of demand, and in general an array of 
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the theoretical and empirical concerns that have to do with trade integration 
between unequal and distant partners (Georgakopoulos et al, 1994). 
4.3. Evaluating the two perspectives: the cost of regionalism 
On the other hand, regional integration has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The main advantage of regional integration has been partly 
elaborated earlier and it refers to the creation of a large single market, where 
demand potential is greater (thus also leading to increased inward FDI), 
economies of scale are more fully or easily exploited (with significant 
productivity and innovation effects), and regional or sectoral imbalances are 
less easily translated into economy-wide shocks and disturbances (which are 
normally linked to small economies, monocultures or duality economies – all 
of which are present characteristics of the fragmented Balkan economic space) 
(Petrakos and Totev, 2000; Petrakos and Economou, 2004). All these 
advantages, if realised, can establish a critical mass (in terms of both market 
and production potentials) that will allow the development of a number of 
dynamic competitive advantages that the region will be able to exploit 
(Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud, 2006). Related to the above is the observation 
that the similarities across countries in the region in terms of production 
structures, comparative advantages and consumer preferences can facilitate 
faster and more organic knowledge transfers (which are linked to higher 
productivity through technological / process innovation) and promote product 
diversification (which is linked to greater incomes through product innovation).  
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This is not perhaps as self-evident as it may sound at first, as many authors 
have argued that the homogeneity of the region does not allow for significant 
synergies to be identified and exploited through economic integration 
(Venables, 2003; Gligorov, 2004; Grupe and Kusic, 2005). Although this 
argument may have some validity in remote and chronically underdeveloped 
areas (Glania and Matthes, 2005), such as the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
it is very doubtful that, for example, the level of development in the Balkans is 
not suitable for a an indigenous tourist industry to develop its own distinctive 
competitive advantages through product differentiation and branding – aspects 
that can only be reinforced and supported by regional integration and intra-
regional intra-industry trade.12  
A similar argument can be made with regards to policy harmonisation – as has 
been already implicitly stated earlier with respect to regional policy. It should 
be clear that it is much easier and less costly to exchange policy ideas within 
the region rather than with a really qualitatively different partner, such as the 
EU. Cultural and historical ties, a common sense of a ‘Balkan way of doing 
things’, but also historical path dependency (especially with regards to 
institutions that have in one form or the other survived all the way through the 
Ottoman period), all imply that institutional arrangements across the region 
have a common language that can be more easily and most costlessly 
communicated across.  
                                                 
12
 Further, the very theoretical argument on which this assertion is based, as has been developed over 
many years by Prof A. Venables and published recently in the Economic Journal (Venables, 2003) has 
attracted wide criticism even within the new trade theory literature (see Krishna, 2003; or Fugazza and 
Robert-Nicoud, 2006).  
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Of course, significant potential disadvantages also exist in the case of regional 
integration. On the one hand are arguments emanating from trade theory, 
relating to the negative consequences in the form of trade diversion, which is 
seen as the natural outcome of regional integration. Although, as stated above, 
this argument has been made quite convincingly both with direct reference to 
the regional literature (Grupe and Kusic, 2005) and at a much more theoretical 
level (Venables, 2003), in effect the argument about trade diversion is 
essentially static (it does not take into account the impact that trade has on 
production specialisations) and of course assumes that there are no serious 
distortions within the region that prevent intra-regional trade in the first place 
(so that one can talk about trade diversion rather than trade creation). Both 
assumptions are largely irrelevant for SEE. On the other hand there is the more 
pragmatic consideration that the region does not possess, for the time being, the 
capacity to create the ‘critical mass’ required to support its own regional 
development. Not only the region is extremely dependent on external demand 
and international aid, but also the region has not yet managed to recover fully 
from the real and psychological traumas that the dissolution of Yugoslavia has 
created (or, for some, is still creating). 
4.4. On the choice between perspectives 
As a conclusion, it appears that there are a number of advantages and 
disadvantages tied to each of the policy options and perspectives, that can be 
neither balanced-out nor ignored. However, rather than suggesting that any, or 
the established, policy option is thus preferable (due to either avoiding the costs 
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of a policy shift or because support for the existing policy is already in place), 
the above observation should be taken to suggest that there is a concrete need 
to counter-balance the process of European integration with a firm move 
towards deeper regional integration – not simply cooperation. Of course, a 
number of problems exist that can make this a very problematic goal. 
Interestingly, these problems are not emanating only from within the region; 
rather, some are also coming from the part of the EU. The EU approach has not 
been –and even today it still isn’t– particularly conducive to regional 
integration. Almost each single country in the region has a different status vis-
à-vis the EU, so it is really questionable whether and how the EU can be seen 
as treating the region as a single entity and as a potential object of organic 
regional cooperation (regionalism).  
Nevertheless, the internal problems appear more serious. The region clearly 
lacks a regional leader. A number of countries that could have taken up this 
role (Greece, Slovenia, Romania or Bulgaria, even Hungary or Austria) have 
not been very successful – or very interested – in doing so. For that matter, the 
new EU member states of the region (Romania and Bulgaria) are more 
interested in catching up with the CEECs than leading the way within the 
region. Ethnic tensions – latent and unresolved – remain a big obstacle to the 
deepening of regional ties; while a number of institutional weaknesses (for 
example weak administrations that face significant difficulties in sufficiently 
absorbing and efficiently implementing European or simply national policies) 
persist and constrain institutional convergence and policy harmonisation also 
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within the region. Finally, in the absence of a sufficient policy framework that 
will be capable of steering the economy and creating the appropriate structures 
of incentives and rents across the region, a number of economic and 
technological factors (including infrastructure) also act as obstacles to a 
speedier and deeper process of regional integration. 
 
5. Concluding thoughts 
The SEE region has been for many years and still is today notably fragmented. 
This is not only the consequence of the traumatic wars in former Yugoslavia, 
but of a series of other factors that have to do both with pre-transition history 
(e.g., the divergent models of socialism applied in each of the old socialist 
Balkan states) and with the EU approach to the region (a slow involvement 
initially, then a fragmented approach, later on some elements of encouraging a 
regional approach but ultimately always predominantly bilateral and multi-
layered). The main form of regionalism that is present in the region, that of a 
regional cooperation process that is externally inspired and built on 
conditionality, is actually and rather openly serving the European perspective 
of the region rather than any well-defined and well-understood internal (and 
internally consistent) objective. This seems in many respects to be a one-way 
trajectory for all countries in the region, with all the countries on the same 
highway driving towards the ‘big EU destination’, albeit on different lanes of 
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the highway and perhaps on different makes of cars.13 Cooperation is only 
happening to the extent that the highway narrows and the cars have to fit into 
fewer lanes without crashing into each other… 
Although this analogy may appear telling, in fact it does not carry any 
connotation as to whether any more structured cooperation among the countries 
in the SEE (the ‘Balkan cars’) would be in fact desirable – not to mention any 
suggestions for the amalgamation of the ‘Balkan cars’ into an orderly and 
cosmopolitan train. Similarly, theory –trade theory or other– does not have very 
clear answers as to whether regional integration should be made a more central 
objective for the region. One can draw from a wide theoretical and quasi-
theoretical literature to identify a long list of costs and benefits associated with 
either kind of perspective (the European versus the regional). Empirically, then, 
this becomes a question concerning the right balance between these two 
perspectives – which can only be decided on the basis of a concrete 
understanding of the economic and other conditions in the region and a firm 
commitment to follow through the policies that appear to be more appropriate 
from a long-run perspective.  
Given the recent moves towards normalisation of the situation in the region, 
with the gradual increase in economic interactions even among entities that 
were until recently fighting bloody wars, the signs for a lasting adherence to 
international law for conflict resolution, and the stabilisation and growth of the 
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 In this sense, perhaps today, after Romania’s accession to the EU, there exists a historical answer to 
the agonising question as to which has been the best car in the Balkans: Zastava or Dacia!   
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economies, it appears that the region can now cope with, and thus has a choice 
of, more than one option. In other words, it appears that the region is 
increasingly becoming more capable to support its own developmental 
trajectory and thus to define its own developmental needs and wants. 
Nevertheless, with this capacity comes also an increasing desire to ‘escape’ the 
region and to become singularly ‘European’. Regional cooperation, although 
often heralded in bold letters, is still largely seen as a burden, even a liability, 
from a commitment that ‘one had once to make’.  
In this sense, the developments at the level of the EU, with the postponement of 
future enlargements, EU distancing and the new doctrine of ‘regional 
ownership’, offer indeed a tremendous opportunity to the region to take control 
of its own development and thus to pause and revaluate its priorities and long-
term interests. No matter how smoothly or how fast integration with the EU 
proceeds and how deep it becomes, there is a shared responsibility in the region 
to create its own integrated and coherent regional market, to activate the long-
slumbering regional multipliers, and to strengthen those regional specialisations 
that can upgrade the value produced in the region and thus lead to a qualitative 
upgrading of regional production as a whole. In other words, there is a shared 
responsibility in the region to identify and strengthen its competitive position in 
the international division of labour.  
This is not a goal that can be pursued optionally and only by the very 
ambitious. In the context of intense competition in the global economy, where 
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regional and sectoral advantages shift rapidly and product life cycles shrink, 
moreover, in a world of international sub-regionalisation, an unconnected 
collection of small states in a historically problematic peninsula in the corner of 
Europe has no chance to compete and to converge to the standards to which it 
aspires. Rather, a real threat exists that the region may very easily become a 
“new European south” (Petrakos, 2002; Economides and Monastiriotis, 2006) 
and suffer the persistent developmental (or, simply, underdevelopment) 
problems that Greece and southern Italy have experienced for so long.  
Of course, dangers and ambiguities exist with either of the two options. For 
example, the European perspective entails the threat of dragging the most 
industrialised / advanced countries of the region to a backward path by 
encouraging the development of regressive specialisations; while the regional 
perspective can create similar problems by slowing down or even diverting the 
process of economic (and institutional) modernisation, which is very 
successfully triggered by association to the European economy and polity.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this is not an issue of a singular choice over 
two competing alternatives; rather, it is an issue of balance. The question is not 
about whether to integrate to Europe or internally and should not be about 
whether regional cooperation is a means or an end. Instead, it should be clear 
that there are real benefits from regional integration and this should be actively 
pursued in conjunction with, but not in anticipation of or with the aspiration 
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for, European integration.14 But for the economies and markets to integrate, 
conscious and specific effort is required in the front of policy. Policy 
harmonisation within the region, so as to avoid negative competition and to 
facilitate economic interaction and market integration, should be made a central 
objective of national policy-makers and of the newly established Regional 
Cooperation Council. Policy harmonisation through the Europeanisation of 
policies may be at the end of the road a process sufficient to harmonise policies 
also internally in the region; but given the timeframe for future enlargements 
and the acuteness of the developmental problems faced by the region, this 
process is not necessarily best.  
To sum up, it appears in many respects that ‘cooperation without accession’ as 
the issue was put in the opening paragraph of this paper, is indeed a blessing 
for the SEE region. By conditioning European integration on regional 
cooperation, the latter effectively became an instrument for the former – both 
for the EU and for the SEE countries. Thus, regional cooperation became 
dissociated from the key underlying reasons for which regional cooperation 
was originally sought – namely socio-political reconciliation and economic 
development. Despite the rhetoric, regional cooperation remains today just that: 
a process of loose cooperation without any prospects for institutional deepening 
or functional strengthening. In this process, any calls for regional integration 
                                                 
14
 This of course raises the question as to whether the two perspectives are inherently incompatible. 
There are clear instances where trade-offs between the European and the regional perspective can be 
identified – for example, the introduction of VISA controls in Bulgaria following its accession to the 
EU – but there is also a plethora of cases where the two processes are complementary (most 
emphatically in the area of trade liberalisation).  
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fall into a vacuum, as regional integration becomes a secondary issue – if not 
simply a distraction. Within this context, the recent developments with regards 
to ‘EU distancing’ and ‘regional ownership’ (which are largely exogenous, in 
the sense that they constitute responses, at least partly, to EU’s own internal 
problems) create the space for a re-consideration of what regional integration is 
and what it means for the region; and to the optimist they also allow for a 
possible re-launching of regional integration as a stated policy objective in the 
region. In this sense, ‘regional cooperation without accession’, despite the 
possible ‘disillusionment’ for those left temporarily out, is an opportunity for 
SEE to promote its own regional identity and its own developmental model and 
trajectory. Surely a blessing! 
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